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Abstract
The empirical literature in corporate nance has documented robust ndings regarding lever-
age, dividend, and investment decisions that appear inconsistent with the predictions of lead-
ing theories. For instance, many papers report negative relations between protability and
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rm that is able to rationalize the main empirical ndings in a unied way. In
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under study as well as their dependence on the primitive characteristics of the 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1 Introduction
During the last decades, the empirical literature in corporate nance has reported a few regu-
larities regarding leverage, dividend, and investment decisions. Many of these results have been
used to question the validity of central theories whose implications were found to be inconsis-
tent with the empirical evidence. For instance, the negative relation between protability and
leverage, which has been documented in numerous studies, has been used to cast doubt on the
trade-o¤ theory of capital structure, and to support alternative, competing theories, such as the
pecking order model of nancing decisions.1 As another example, the fact that rms that pay
lower dividends exhibit stronger investment-cash ow sensitivities has been used to criticize the
assumption of perfect capital markets in the context of the neoclassical intertemporal model of
investment.2 We propose a simple dynamic model of the rm that is able to rationalize the main
empirical ndings, providing plausible justications for all of them.
In the dynamic model we propose, investment and leverage decisions are the choice variables
of the rm, while dividends arise endogenously as a residual of the other two. More precisely, the
rm decides how much to invest for the next period, as well as how to nance those assets (i.e.,
with debt and/or equity), depending on current prot shocks and its own primitive characteristics.
We nd that two rm characteristics are of particular importance in explaining rm behavior,
namely, the curvature of the production function and non-debt tax shields (e.g., depreciation,
operating costs, and R&D expenses).3 The inuence of these features is such that they often
overwhelm the e¤ect of the others and explain most of our results. In order to replicate the
main empirical ndings, we create a panel of rms that di¤er regarding primitive characteristics
and simulate their choices by using our model. We then construct the variables of interest (e.g.,
dividends, prots, etc) from those decisions. Finally, we pool the constructed variables for the
di¤erent types of rms in the panel and run the standard regressions used by the empirical
literature in corporate nance. Our results are in line with the empirical regularities and the
1See, e.g., Fama and French (2002) for a recent discussion on this and other related issues.
2See, e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988).
3The industrial organization literature in economics has extensively studied the curvature of the production
function (see, e.g., Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry, and Pakes (2007), Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2006), and the
references therein).
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model we use allows us to o¤er structural justications for each of them. We next describe our
main ndings.
We start studying leverage and dividend decisions. The standard, static version of the trade-
o¤ model predicts that more protable rms should have more leverage. The empirical evidence
shows almost unanimously that the opposite result holds in practice (e.g., Long and Malitz
(1985), Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Fama and French (2002)). The
dynamic model we o¤er can accommodate this result, which is the seemingly most important
inconsistency of the trade-o¤ theory of capital structure. Specically, we run the corresponding
regression with data simulated from our model and nd a signicantly negative coe¢ cient on
protability in leverage decisions. Briey, the reason is as follows: When leverage and investment
decisions are simultaneously made, protability arises endogenously as a consequence of those
choices. Moreover, we nd that those rm characteristics that have the largest impact on book
and market leverage (i.e., the curvature of the production function and non-debt tax shields)
are the same features with the greatest e¤ect on protability. In addition, the e¤ect of those
characteristics on book and market leverage is opposite in sign to that on protability. Then,
rms with combinations of features that make them highly protable tend to have, at the same
time, low book and market leverage and vice versa. When these rms are pooled in a single
regression, the negative coe¢ cient on protability naturally occurs.
The dynamic model of the rm we o¤er can also rationalize several other observed results
about leverage and dividends in the cross-section of rms (Fama and French (2002) contains
a comprehensive summary of these ndings). For instance, the empirical work has noted that
corporations with higher dividend payouts are more protable and invest less. Furthermore, it
has reported that rms with more leverage have lower dividend payouts, and that rms with
more investment opportunities (i.e., higher market-to-book ratio) and higher volatility of prots
have lower leverage and dividends. Finally, the empirical evidence suggests that leverage is
negatively associated with non-debt tax shields.4 Results in our model are consistent with all these
observations and the structural explanations follow the same argument as above. That is, the
4The model developed by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) predicts a negative association between leverage and
non-debt tax shields.
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elasticity of capital and non-debt tax shields are the dominant rm characteristics, driving these
endogenous variables consistently with the observed evidence. More importantly, these results
emerge in a simple dynamic model with no agency costs or asymmetric information problems,
which are the usual assumptions invoked to justify most of these relationships. The former
include Fama and Miller (1972), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977), Easterbrook (1984),
and Jensen (1986), while the latter include Myers and Majluf (1984).
We close the study of leverage and dividend decisions by addressing one of the most puzzling
empirical ndings, that is, the existence of all-equity rms. This phenomenon is extensively
documented by Strebulaev and Yang (2013), who report that an average of around 10% of large
public nonnancial U.S. rms have had zero debt in the last decades. They also nd that those
rms pay relatively higher taxes and dividends, are more protable, and have higher market-to-
book ratios. Furthermore, they suggest this observation is independent of rm size. Our dynamic
model can replicate all these ndings, shedding light on this long-standing puzzle. The structural
explanation is that certain combinations of primitive characteristics give rise to rms making this
type of decisions. More specically, rms with high non-debt tax shields will have low, possibly
zero, leverage. When those rms also have low elasticity of capital, they turn out to be highly
protable, have high market-to-book ratios, and pay large dividends and taxes. Finally, because
these results arise under the normalization of the parameter that regulates rm size (the drift of
the prot shock process), the previous results hold irrespective of how large the rm is.
We nally study investment decisions. One of the most prominent results is the empiri-
cal observation that rms perceived a priori as more nancially constrained, exhibit stronger
investment-cash ow sensitivities, even after controlling for marginal q (e.g., see Fazzari, Hub-
bard, and Petersen (1988), Hubbard (1998), and the references therein). This result has been
used to criticize the neoclassical model of investment as it suggests that capital market imper-
fections are necessary to explain observed investment behavior. Our dynamic model is able to
rationalize this result even in the context of a perfect capital market or, in other terms, without
nancial constraints. We do the usual regression of investment ratio on internal cash ow and
market-to-book ratio employing the simulated cross-section of rms and nd that, indeed, the
coe¢ cients on internal cash ow and market-to-book ratio are signicantly positive. Most im-
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portantly, we nd that rms that pay a smaller proportion of net income as dividends (i.e., the
candidates to be considered more nancially constrained) have larger investment-cash ow sen-
sitivities, and vice versa. The force behind this result is that rms with high elasticity of capital,
the dominant characteristic for these endogenous variables, turn out to have low dividend ratios
and high investment-cash ow sensitivies. Furthermore, most of the other parameters a¤ect these
variables in opposite direction, which reinforces the negative association between them.
Last, but not least, we relate our work with existing dynamic programming models of the rm.
Hennessy and Whited (2005) rationalize the negative relation between leverage and protability
with a dynamic model that features nancial transaction costs. Using a time-series approach,
they show that leverage is negatively related with protability and lagged cash ow, as well as
with an external nance weighted average q. Similarly, Tserlukevich (2008) uses a dynamic real
options model emphasizing on irreversibility and xed costs of investments. He nds that lever-
age is negatively associated with protability, mean-reverting, and path dependent. In addition,
Moyen (2004) uses a dynamic model to reconcile the contradictory empirical evidence presented
by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997).5 In order to achieve
that goal, she compares the investment-cash ow sensitivity for two di¤erent types of rms: those
that su¤er nancing constraints and have no access to external capital versus unconstrained rms
that can access external funds. We contribute to this literature by rationalizing the empirical reg-
ularities explained by these papers with a dynamic programming model that features no frictions
neither on the real nor the nancing side. Instead, we search for the answers by emphasizing on
the link between the endogenous variables under study and the primitive characteristics of the
rm in the cross-sectional analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we derive a dynamic model of the rm in
closed-form. In Section 3, we describe the model predictions regarding leverage, dividends, and
investments, and explain the structural forces underlying them. Section 4 concludes. Appendix
1 describes briey the proof of the solution of the problem of the rm, while Appendix 2 contains
the sensitivity analysis of the main model variables.
5Kaplan and Zingales (1997) report ndings suggesting that investment-cash ow sensitivities cannot be used
to identify rms subject to nancing constraints.
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2 A Dynamic Model of the Firm
This section describes the dynamic model of the rm as well as its explicit solution.6 We then
explain how the optimal decisions of the rm depend on its primitive characteristics.
We use discrete-time, innite-horizon, stochastic dynamic programming to solve the problem
of the rm. Thus, the life horizon of the rm is innite and the CEO makes decisions at the
end of every period (e.g., quarter, year, etc.) in order to maximize the stock price. Our model
includes two fundamental features that enhance the existing dynamic programming models of the
rm in corporate nance. First, we introduce long-run growth, which could be interpreted as the
possibility of the rm to take advantage of new protable investments in the future. (We write a
tilde on variable eX to indicate that the variable is growing over time.) Second, the model is based
on the separation principle, which states managers maximize shareholderswealth by undertaking
the investments that maximize rm value, independently of equityholderspersonal preferences.
It follows that our model does not require any assumption about shareholdersutility functions,
as long as we discount future cash ows with an appropriately risk-adjusted discount rate.7
The rm has two variables of choice: capital and debt. The book value of assets in period
t is indicated by variable eKt. The capital of the rm eKt is used for production and varies (i.e.,
increases or decreases) over time because of investment decisions. Firm assets depreciate at
constant rate  > 0 in each period. Variable eDt represents the book value of debt in period t. We
assume debt matures in one period and is rolled over at the end of every period. Furthermore, as
a means to simplify the analysis, we assume the coupon rate cB equals the market cost of debt
rB, which implies that book value of debt eDt equals market value of debt eBt. The rm increases
and decreases the amount of outstanding debt eBt over time as needed in order to maximize the
market value of equity. In the spirit of DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited (2011), we assume the
rm keeps debt risk-free over its life, so that it can always repay its debt in full. This limited
debt capacity assumption can be motivated from the literature on credit rationing in the context
of imperfect information (see, e.g., Ja¤ee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)), and
6The model we study is similar to the one used by Lazzati and Menichini (2013).
7See, for example, Copeland, Weston, and Shastri (2005) for a more complete discussion of the separation
principle.
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helps us to rationalize the observation of debt conservatism reported by Graham (2000). Then,
in our model, the market cost of debt rB equals the risk-free interest rate rf .
There is one exogenous state variable that makes the model stochastic, the prot shock zt.
We assume prot shocks follow an AR(1) process in logs
ln (zt) = ln (c) +  ln (zt 1) + "t (1)
where the autoregressive parameter  2 (0; 1) denes the persistence of prot innovations. When
 is high, the periods of high prots (e.g., economic booms) and low prots (e.g., recessions)
are longer on average, and vice versa. The innovation term "t is assumed to be an iid normal
random variable with mean 0 and variance 2. The drift in logs c > 0 scales the moments of the
distribution of zt and plays an important role in the expected prots of the rm.8
Earnings before interest and taxes in period t are
eEt = (1 + g)t(1 ) zt eKt   f eKt    eKt (2)
where zt is the realization of the prot innovation in period t and parameter  2 (0; 1) represents
the curvature of the production function. The factor (1 + g)t(1 ) can be interpreted as the level
of technology available to the rm in period t and allows for a required normalization of growing
variables that we describe in Appendix 1. This feature implies the rm can grow at constant
rate g  0 in each period. Equation (2) shows that the gross prots function (the rst term) is
of the Cobb-Douglas form with decreasing returns to scale in capital input. We assume that the
secular growth rate is lower than the market cost of equity (i.e., g < rS), a requirement needed
to guarantee existence of market value of equity. The market cost of equity is exogenous and
depends on the risk of the stock price. The last two terms of equation (2) are the non-debt tax
shields and include the operating costs f eKt (with f > 0) and capital depreciation  eKt of the
period.
Finally, taking into account that the rm pays income tax on corporate earnings at rate
 2 (0; 1), net prots of the rm in period t are
eNt =  eEt   rB eBt (1  ) : (3)
8 It has been common in the literature to normalize parameter c = 1.
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We can then dene the accounting cash ow equation as
eLt = eNt   h eKt+1   eKt   eBt+1   eBti (4)
which represents the dividend paid by the rm to shareholders in period t. This dividend equals
net prots minus the change in equity. Given the current state of the rm at t = 0,
 eK0; eB0; z0,
the CEO chooses an innite sequence of functions
n eKt+1; eBt+1o1
t=0
that maximize the market
value of equity. Accordingly, the stock price is given by







subject to the restriction of risk-free debt, and where E0 denotes the expectation operator given
information at t = 0 (i.e., eK0; eB0; z0). We describe next the general solution of the dynamic
model in closed-form. (Appendix 1 contains a sketch of proof for the optimal policies.) A direct
benet of obtaining closed-form solutions is that we can easily see how rm decisions depend on
primitive characteristics.
Optimal Firm Decisions
eKt+1 (zt) = (1 + g)t+1E [zt+1jzt] 11  W  and eBt+1 (zt) = ` eKt+1 (zt) : (6)
This expression shows optimal capital, eKt+1 (zt), and debt, eBt+1 (zt), for next period as explicit
functions of rm characteristics. Factor (1 + g)t+1 in eKt+1 (zt) denotes the accumulated growth
since rm inception, while E [zt+1jzt] = czt e
1
2
2 is the conditional expectation of the prot shock
in the next period given current shock. This factor introduces correlation across time in rm








and denotes the part of optimal capital that does not depend on the current shock. In our model,




1  (f + ) (1  )




This optimal book leverage ratio is the maximum book leverage consistent with risk-free debt,
and it can be interpreted as the target leverage of the rm.9 It is readily veried that ` is
(strictly) less than 1, decreases in non-debt tax shields (i.e., operating costs f and depreciation
) and the market cost of debt rB, and is an increasing function of the income tax rate  .
In expression (6), we observe that optimal capital increases with parameter . As  goes
up, the concavity of the production function with respect to capital input diminishes and the
marginal productivity (and benets) of capital increases.10 The optimal capital also increases
with the expected prot shock E [zt+1jzt]. In turn, the expected prot shock increases with the
drift parameter c, current prot shock zt, and volatility of innovations , which make the rm
increase its optimal assets to take more advantage of their higher expected prots. The e¤ect
of the persistence parameter  on expected prot shocks depends on the value of current prot
shock zt. When zt > 1, they grow with , while the opposite is true when zt < 1.11 A negative
e¤ect on optimal capital level occurs with the ve parameters in the denominator of W . Higher
market costs of equity rS , and debt rB, income taxes  , operating costs f , and depreciation 
increase the costs of capital and the rm diminishes optimal assets accordingly.
The next expression shows the market value of equity as an explicit solution of the model. It
represents an analytic solution to the Gordon Growth Model in the stochastic setting, and it can
thereby be used for valuation purposes.
Market Value of Equity
eSt  eKt; eBt; zt = h(1 + g)t(1 ) zt eKt   f eKt    eKt   rB eBti (1  ) + eKt   eBt + fMtP : (9)
The rst three terms on the right-hand side of equation (9) represent the (after-shock) book value
of equity, while the last term is the going-concern value. Variable fMt is given by























9The derivation of ` is in Lazzati and Menichini (2013), Appendix 1.
10The e¤ect of  on optimal capital is positive for most values of the parameters, but it could be negative for
some extreme combinations of paramaters.
11For standard values of the parameters, the invariant unconditional mean of prot shocks E [z] is slightly above
1. Thus, the event z < 1 is fairly frequent.
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and denotes the discounted sum of unconditional means of prot shocks. The general term of








0@c 1 n1  znt e 122 (1 2n)(1 2) 1(1 )
1A 11  (11)
and indicates the expected prot shock n periods from today given current innovation zt.12




   fW    W    rB`W 

(1  )  rSW  (1  `) (12)
and denotes the dollar return on equity minus the dollar cost of equity at the optimum.13 Finally,
factor (1 + g)t in equation (10) represents the t periods of accumulated past growth while factor
(1 + g) on the numerator of the discount factor in fMt introduces future growth into share price.
The next section shows that our model is able to rationalize several empirical ndings in the
cross-section of rms, and provides a structural explanation for each of them.
3 Structural Justication of the Main Empirical Findings
The empirical literature in nancial economics has reported several regularities regarding rm
decisions and outcomes. Some of these results appear to be inconsistent with the static trade-
o¤ theory of capital structure while some others have been used to question the assumption of
perfect capital markets in the context of the neoclassical model of investment. The aim of this
section is to show that our dynamic model captures fundamental aspects of rm behavior and,
thus, can rationalize those critical ndings in the cross-section of rms. The key step toward this
12We obtain fMt in the following way. Let A0 = 0 and, for n = 1; 2; :::;












Then, we iterate the previous recursion until convergence (i.e., until An = An 1 = A). Finally, we compute fMt as
fMt = (1 + g)t e  122 (1 )2 A:
13Lazzati and Menichini (2013) show that P  is (strictly) positive.
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achievement is to treat the relevant variables used in the literature as endogenous and to explain
how their values depend on the di¤erent primitive characteristics of the rm.
In order to facilitate the reading of the following subsections, we describe those variables
next.14 We dene book and market leverage in the usual way.
Book Leverage: `bt =
eBteKt+ eNt and Market Leverage: `mt = eBteBt+eSt( eKt; eBt;zt) :
We introduce dividend payout as dividends over capital and investment ratio as investment over
capital.
Dividend Payout: dpt =
eLteKt+ eNt and Investment Ratio: it = eKt (1 ) eKt 1eKt 1+ eNt 1 :
Regarding protability, we follow the norm in the literature and dene it as earnings before
interest and taxes over capital.
Protability: pt =
eEteKt+ eNt :
Then, we dene internal cash ow as net prots plus capital depreciation over capital.
Internal Cash Flow: ht =
eNt+ eKteKt+ eNt :
Finally, market-to-book ratio is dened as the market value of assets over their book value.
Market-to-Book Ratio: qt =
eBt+eSt( eKt; eBt;zt)eKt+ eNt :
Since all of the above variables are functions of the optimal policies, they are indeed endoge-
nous in our analysis. The relationships between these variables and the primitive rm charac-
teristics cannot be described by simple inspection, as we did in the previous section with the
optimal policies. Given that these relationships are at the heart of our structural explanations,
14 In order to make our conclusions comparable with the extant empirical work, we match the denition of these
variables with the ones used by those studies. For instance, the leverage ratio ` in equation (8) represents the
optimal level of leverage exactly after the rm makes the decision, but before the prot shock of the period is
realized. However, it is unlikely that Compustat captures that ideal situation. To the extent that Compustat data
are recorded at moments di¤erent from that of the decision, they will reect the partial or total realization of the
prot shock in the period. For this reason, we study the after-shock version of these variables.
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we provide a sensitivity analysis in Appendix 2. One of the main results we obtain is that the
curvature of the production function () and the non-debt tax shields (f+) are the two features
of the rm with the largest impact on the values of those endogenous variables.
In the following subsections we evaluate our model predictions regarding leverage, dividends,
and investments.
3.1 Model Predictions About Leverage and Dividends
One of the main results reported by the empirical capital structure literature is the negative
association between leverage and protability. This inverse relationship usually appears in pooled
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of leverage ratios and is one of the most persistent
ndings in the cross-section of rms. It has been used to challenge the trade-o¤ theory of nancing
decisions with the following argument: under that theory, more protable rms should have more
leverage, after controlling for other e¤ects, because their expected bankruptcy costs are lower.
We next show that our dynamic model can rationalize this provocative nding. Moreover, by
linking the endogenous variables in our model to the primitive characteristics of the rm, we
provide a transparent justication for that negative association. We nally show our model can
also explain other usual observed regularities regarding leverage and dividends.
In order to replicate the empirical ndings, we rst simulate the behavior of a heterogeneous
group of rms (i.e., rms with di¤erent primitive characteristics) and then use pooled OLS regres-
sions to study the associations between rm decisions and certain variables that are often treated
as exogenous (e.g., protability and market-to-book ratio).15 We introduce rm heterogeneity
into our analysis by using three SIC industries that display considerably di¤erent curvature of
the production function and non-debt tax shields, which we show in Appendix 2 are among the
most inuential rm characteristics. In particular, we select Oil and Gas Extraction (OGE) as an
industry with high capital elasticity and low non-debt tax shields, Chemicals (C) as an industry
with an intermediate curvature of the production function and high non-debt tax shields, and
Printing and Publishing (PP) as an industry with low capital elasticity and intermediate levels
15We use pooled OLS because it is one of the most common tools employed by the empirical capital structure
literature to study the cross-section of rms.
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of non-debt tax shields. We compute the model parameters for each industry using Compustat
data and show their values in Table I. Lazzati and Menichini (2013) describe the procedure used
to obtain those parameters for each industry.
[Insert Table I here]
Table II exhibits summary statistics for a representative rm from each of the three industries.
We obtain these results after simulating each industry over 100,000 periods with the parameter-
ization shown in Table I. We then use the last 100 observations from this simulation for each
industry and do a pooled OLS regression of book leverage in order to study the model predic-
tions regarding the cross-section of rms. For the regression, we use the standard specication
Yi;t = + Xi;t 1 + i;t (13)
where i indexes rms, t indexes time periods, Y denotes, alternatively, current values of book
leverage, market leverage, and dividend payout, and X is a set of 1-period lagged values of
protability, market-to-book ratio, cash ow volatility, and dividend payout. (We compute cash
ow volatility as the standard deviation of the last 10 periods of protability.) Finally, i;t is an
iid random term.
[Insert Table II here]
The results from estimating equation (13) for book leverage, as well as for market leverage
and dividend payout, are presented in Table III.
[Insert Table III here]
Regarding the regression of book leverage, the coe¢ cient estimate on protability
is signicantly negative, which implies that more protable rms tend to have less
leverage. In our model, this inverse association can be easily explained: First, Appendix 2
shows that the parameters that have the largest impact on book leverage, namely, the curvature
of the production function () and the non-debt tax shields (f + ), are the same parameters
with the greatest e¤ect on protability. Second, the impact of those parameters on book leverage
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is of opposite sign to that on protability. Thus, in a cross-section of rms subject to di¤erent
primitive features, the association between leverage and protability will (most probably) be
negative. Figure 1 shows this result graphically.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Panel A displays book leverage versus protability for each of the three industries, that
is, OGE rms (square dots), C rms (dots with crosses), and PP rms (round dots). Of the
three industries, OGE rms have the highest elasticity of capital and the lowest non-debt tax
shields. This combination of parameters produces high leverage and low protability on average.
Conversely, C rms have lower elasticity of capital and higher non-debt tax shields. Accordingly,
they have lower leverage and higher protability on average. When these industries are pooled
in an OLS regression, the negative association between these two endogenous variables naturally
arises as a consequence of their dissimilar characteristics and the impact of these characteristics
on the variables under study.
Table III also shows that book leverage is negatively associated with market-to-book ratio,
cash ow volatility, and dividend payout. These results are also consistent with the empirical
ndings. As before, the elasticity of capital () and the non-debt tax shields (f + ) are among
the dominant parameters for the last three variables. Furthermore, the e¤ect of these parameters
on those three variables is opposite to the e¤ect on book leverage, which generates the negative
relationship in a cross-section of rms. Panel B in Figure 1 shows graphically the negative
relationship between book leverage and market-to-book ratio.
The results about market leverage are displayed on the third column in Table III, and are
similar to those of book leverage.16 The structural reasons behind these ndings are similar as
well, except that, for market leverage, other rm characteristics (i.e., the autoregressive coe¢ cient
() and the market discount rate of equity (rS)) also play an important role. The last column
of Table III shows the results for the dividend payout regression. The coe¢ cient on protability
is positive, implying that more protable rms tend to pay higher dividends. The structural
16The slightly negative slope on protability is due to collinearity between protability and dividend payout.
Removing dividend payout from the regression makes the slope on protability become strongly negative, as
expected.
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reason is that the curvature of the production function () and the non-debt tax shields (f + )
are the dominant parameters for these two endogenous variables and a¤ect them in the same
direction. Table III also shows that market-to-book ratio, cash ow volatility, and book leverage
have signicantly negative coe¢ cients. Again, the underlying forces explaining these results are
the opposite e¤ects of the dominant parameters on the variables of interest.
We have shown the model we o¤er is able to rationalize many of the main regularities regarding
leverage and dividend decisions. The next subsection explains a long-term puzzle regarding
observed leverage decisions, namely, the fact that certain rms have no debt.
3.2 On the Existence of Zero-Leverage Firms
The existence of large, protable, and stable rms that use zero debt is hard to explain in the
context of the trade-o¤ theory of nancing decisions. According to that theory, they could issue
some debt in order to shield earnings from income taxes and, thus, increase shareholders wealth.
In a recent paper, Strebulaev and Yang (2013) o¤er an in-depth study of zero-debt rms. They
report that in the last decades, on average, these rms comprise around 10% of large public
nonnancial U.S. rms. They also nd that those all-equity rms tend to be relatively more
protable, have higher market-to-book ratios, and pay higher taxes and dividends than control
rms. Moreover, they suggest that this phenomenon is independent of rm size. We next show
that the dynamic model we o¤er can rationalize the existence of all-equity rms as
well as their observed characteristics.
A key aspect of our model is that it features a more conservative debt behavior as compared to
the one implied by the trade-o¤ theory. This feature is captured by the risk-free debt assumption
we discussed earlier. Under risk-free debt, optimal leverage ` in equation (8) suggests that
zero-leverage rms will be those with very high non-debt tax shields and low income tax rate.
We can then rationalize zero-leverage decisions by simulating the behavior of a rm with those
characteristics. In Appendix 2, we explain that, if we combine those characteristics with a low
elasticity of capital (the main primitive features), the resulting rm will tend to have, in addition
to zero-leverage, relatively high protability, market-to-book ratio, dividend payout, and tax
ratio (i.e., taxes over capital). Furthermore, because the drift in logs (c), which regulates the
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size of the rm, has been normalized to 1, these results hold irrespective of rm size. We can
appreciate these predictions by comparing OGE versus C rms. Table I shows that the former
have high elasticity of capital and low non-debt tax shields while the opposite is true for the
latter. Accordingly, Table II shows that C rms have lower leverage (24.95% vs. 68.53%), higher
protability (39.29% vs. 15.10%), higher market-to-book ratio (8.40 vs. 3.20), higher dividend
payout (27.49% vs. 6.95%), and higher tax ratio (8.93% vs. 3.47%) than OGE rms. These
model predictions are consistent with the main ndings of Strebulaev and Yang (2013).
Overall, our results suggest that the existence of zero-debt rms is not a puzzle and is consis-
tent with shareholder value maximization under the restriction of risk-free debt. These ndings
possibly constitute the strongest evidence in favor of our dynamic model of the rm. Next, we
describe the link between investment ratio, internal cash ow, and market-to-book ratio, and
rationalize some results found by the empirical investment literature.
3.3 Model Predictions About Investments
The neoclassical intertemporal model of investment predicts that marginal q should be a su¢ -
cient statistics in investment regressions, that is, it should capture all relevant factors a¤ecting
investment decisions. However, a large body of empirical research shows that prediction almost
never holds, since di¤erent measures of internal funds (e.g., output, sales, and internal cash ow)
enter investment regressions as statistically signicant regressors with a considerable explana-
tory power. Furthermore, the sensitivity of investment with respect to internal funds seems to
be greater for those rms considered in principle to be more nancially constrained, even after
controlling for investment opportunities (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988)). These
ndings have been used to challenge the validity of the assumption of perfect capital markets.
We next show that our dynamic model is able to rationalize these empirical observations. To this
end, we estimate the corresponding regression with simulated data and show that the coe¢ cient
on internal cash ow can be easily signicantly positive in investment regressions, even after
controlling for marginal q. Most importantly, we show that rms that pay fewer dividends (i.e.,
the candidates to be considered more nancially constrained) have larger investment-cash ow
sensitivities, and vice versa.
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Table II shows the mean dividend ratio (i.e., the proportion of net prots paid out as divi-
dends) for the three SIC industries: OGE rms pay out a relatively low proportion of net income
as dividends (58.52%) while C and PP rms pay out a relatively high fraction of net prots
(91.43% and 98.11%, respectively).17 Then, we do the following standard investment regression
ii;t = + 1qi;t 1 + 2hi;t 1 + i;t (14)
for each of the three types of rms and show the results in Table IV. First, we nd that con-
trolling for investment opportunities, the coe¢ cient on internal cash ow is strongly positive in
all investment regressions. This result is consistent with the long-standing empirical evidence.
Second, the sensitivity of investment to internal cash ow is considerably higher for low dividend
rms (2 = 5:670 for OGE rms) as compared to high dividend rms (2 = 2:302 for C rms and
2 = 3:492 for PP rms). This nding coincides with the evidence presented by Fazzari, Hub-
bard, and Petersen (1988), though we obtain their result without any type of nancial constraint.
The structural force behind our nding is that the investment-cash ow sensitivity is strongly
positively a¤ected by the curvature of the production function (), while the opposite e¤ect holds
for the dividend ratio. Thus, rms with high elasticity of capital (e.g., OGE rms) will pay low
dividends and exhibit high investment-cash ow sensitivities, and vice versa. In addition, most
of the other parameters have an opposite e¤ect on those variables, reinforcing the inverse relation
between them.
[Insert Table IV here]
Panel A in Figure 2 provides a clear graphical representation of these ndings. We can see
there that the points corresponding to the low dividend OGE rms (square dots) generate a much
steeper slope than those of the high dividend C rms (dots with crosses) and PP rms (round
dots).
[Insert Figure 2 here]
17The dividend ratio equals dividends over net prots, i.e., drt =
eLteNt . Net prots, eNt, in the denominator is
frequently close to zero in numerical simulations, which produces extreme values of the ratio and heavy-tailed
numerical distributions. Therefore, we use the interquartile mean as a more robust measure of centrality.
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4 Conclusion
Over time, the empirical side of the nancial economics literature has documented a series of reg-
ularities regarding leverage, dividend, and investment decisions. Concomitantly, the theoretical
side of the literature has been able to rationalize many of those results with di¤erent models (e.g.,
models of agency and asymmetric information) or assuming market imperfections (e.g., nancing
constraints). We provide a dynamic model of the rm that is able to rationalize most of those
ndings simultaneously without assuming frictions either on the real or the nancing side. We
show that the model we o¤er can explain, for instance, the observed negative association of lever-
age with protability, the inverse relationship between dividend ratios and investment-cash ow
sensitivities, as well as the existence of rms with zero debt and their observed characteristics.
We believe the minimalist approach we employ, making explicit the endogeneity of the variables
under study as well as their dependence on the primitive features of the rm, can also yield
successful results in order to understand empirical ndings in other areas of corporate nance.
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5 Appendix 1: Sketch of the Proof of the Solution of the Dy-
namic Model
In this appendix, we describe the main steps required to solve the rm problem in equation (5).
We let vector eXt = n eKt; eBt; eEt; eNt; eLt; eSto contain the model variables that grow over time. As a
rst step, we do the following normalization: Xt = eXt=(1 + g)t. For instance, normalized capital
is: Kt = eKt=(1+g)t. This normalization is required to keep the expectation of the payo¤ function
in the future periods bounded. After the corresponding modication of the payo¤ function, we
can reexpress the market value of equity as









subject to the restriction of risk-free debt.
We solve this maximization problem recursively by using the Bellman equation associated to
expression (15). We follow the norm in the literature and let normalized variables with primes
denote values in the next period and normalized variables with no primes indicate current values
(e.g., if we are at period t, then next-period assets are K 0 = Kt+1 and current assets are K = Kt).
Then, we can write the Bellman equation for the problem of the rm in equation (15) as










K 0; B0; z0
 jz (16)
subject to keeping debt risk-free. By using the standard backward induction arguments to solve





z0jz 11  W  and B0 = `K 0 (17)
where E [z0jz] = cze 122 , and W  and ` are as described in equations (7) and (8), respectively.
6 Appendix 2: Sensitivity Analysis of Relevant Model Variables
In this appendix, we analyze how the asymptotic mean of the main model variables change when
we vary the primitive characteristics of the rm. This sensitivity analysis allow us to understand
the direction in which the fundamental parameters a¤ect each of those variables as well as the
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magnitude of that e¤ect. This analysis is important because the pooled OLS regressions in our
study capture the long-run behavior of rms subject di¤erent primitive characteristics.
In order to perform this exercise, we start parameterizing the model described in the Section
2. Table V contains the values we use to parameterize the dynamic model for a representative
rm. These values are common in the corporate nance literature. We normalize parameter c
to 1. Following DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited (2011), we set the autoregressive coe¢ cient
() at 0.75 and the standard deviation of the innovation term () at 0.20. We x the elasticity
of capital input () at 0.65, which is close to the parameter estimate of Hennessy and Whited
(2007). Finally, we set operating costs (f) equal to 0.20, the depreciation rate of capital () equal
to 0.10, the corporate income tax rate () at 0.35, the market cost of debt (rB) at 0.02 (which
equals the risk-free interest rate rf ), the market cost of equity (rS) at 0.08, and the secular growth
rate (g) at 0.01. This parameterization refers to a period of a year.
[Insert Table V here]
Then, we simulate the model for 100,000 periods and study the long-run behavior of the main
model variables (after discarding the rst 100 observations). Table VI shows summary statistics
of the stationary distributions of those variables. We nally study how the stationary mean
of book leverage, E (`b), market leverage, E (`m), dividend payout, E (dp), protability, E (p),
market-to-book ratio, E (q), investment ratio, E (i), and investment-cash ow sensitivity, 2 in
equation (14), vary when we change the base case parameter values by up to  20%. These
numerical derivatives are useful to identify the parameters with the strongest e¤ect on those
variables (i.e., the dominant parameters).
[Insert Table VI here]
Table VII displays how the long-run mean book leverage changes with di¤erent parameter
values. One of the most important parameters is the curvature of the production function ().
A 20% increment in the value of  (i.e., from 0.65 to 0.78) increases the asymptotic mean of
book leverage from 70.21% to 73.86%. That is, the higher the elasticity of capital, the higher
the expected book leverage in the long-run. Table VII also suggests that non-debt tax shields
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(e.g., the operating costs (f)) are important parameters. When f increases from 0.20 to 0.24,
the stationary mean book leverage falls from 70.21% to 67.01%. The other parameters a¤ect
expected long-run book leverage to a lesser extent, with the corporate income tax rate () and
the capital depreciation rate () at the top of this second group. In unreported results, we nd
that the sensitivity of the stationary mean of market leverage to the primitive parameters is quite
similar to that of book leverage. In this case, besides the curvature of the production function
and non-debt tax shields, the autoregressive parameter () and the market cost of equity (rS) are
also signicant parameters.
[Insert Table VII here]
Table VIII exhibits the comparative statics analysis of the stationary mean of dividend payout.
It is clear that the elasticity of capital input () has a signicant inuence on this variable. For
the base case parameter value of  = 0:65, E (dp) equals 10.00%, percentage that decreases to
2.06% when  goes up to 0.78. As before, non-debt tax shields (e.g., the operating costs (f))
also play an important role. When f goes up from the base case value of 0.20 to 0.24, mean
dividend payout in the long-run increases from 10.00% to 11.13%. Table VIII also suggest that
the volatility of prot shocks () and the corporate income tax rate () have a considerable
impact on E (dp).
[Insert Table VIII here]
In Table IX, we study the e¤ect of the di¤erent model parameters on the asymptotic mean
of protability E (p). As is the case with book and market leverage, the two most signicant
parameters are the curvature of the production function () and non-debt tax shields (f + ). A
20% increase in  from 0.65 to 0.78 diminishes E (p) from 19.32% to 12.33%, while when f goes
up from 0.2 to 0.24, the long-run mean protability increases from 19.32% to 21.12%. The other
model parameters have a smaller e¤ect on E (p).
[Insert Table IX here]
Table X displays how di¤erent parameter values a¤ect the stationary mean of market-to-book
ratio, E (q). In this case, the autoregressive coe¢ cient (), the elasticity of capital (), and the
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market cost of equity (rS) are the parameters with the largest impact on E (q). Furthermore, the
asymptotic mean of market-to-book ratio decreases in  while it increases in f . The other model
parameters play a smaller role regarding this ratio.
[Insert Table X here]
Table XI exhibits the sensitivity analysis of mean investment ratio, E (i), in the long-run.
As with the other endogenous variables, the most important parameter is the curvature of the
production function (). An increase in  from 0.65 to 0.78 pushes E (i) up from 16.80% to
33.45%. In this case, the standard deviation of the innovation term () and the persistence of
prot shocks () are also important parameters. Increasing  20% from 0.20 to 0.24 makes E (i)
go up from 16.80% to 20.15%, while augmenting  from 0.75 to 0.90 increases E (i) from 16.80%
to 19.46%. The other parameters have a smaller e¤ect on expected long-run investment ratio.
[Insert Table XI here]
The sensitivity analysis of internal cash ow with respect to the di¤erent primitive parameters
is quite similar to that of protability in Table IX, so we omit it.
Finally, Table XII displays the sensitivity analysis for the investment-cash ow sensitivity
(i.e., 2 in equation (14)). By far, the most important parameter is the elasticity of capital ().
Increasing  20% from 0.65 to 0.78 makes 2 go up from 8.400 to 17.783. The other parameters
a¤ect 2 to a lesser extent, with the non-debt tax shields and the autoregressive parameter at
the top of this second group.
[Insert Table XII here]
The sensitivity analysis of dividend ratio is similar to that of dividend payout (so we omit it),
with the curvature of the production function as the dominant parameter.
An important insight from this analysis is that variables frequently used as regressors in em-
pirical work (e.g., protability, market-to-book ratio, etc) are entirely endogenous and, jointly
with the dependent variables, are a¤ected by the same primitive parameters (mainly the curva-
ture of the production function and non-debt tax shields). Then, acknowledging this fact and
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discovering their link to the structural parameters is a fundamental step in order to understand
rm decisions in the cross-section.
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Panel A: Book Leverage vs. Protability
Panel B: Book Leverage vs. Market-to-Book Ratio
Figure 1. Book leverage versus protability and market-to-book ratio. The model is
simulated over 100,000 periods for each industry with the parameterizations described in Table I. The
industries are Oil and Gas Extraction (OGE), Chemicals (C), and Printing and Publishing (PP). Panel A
exhibits the last 100 observations of book leverage and protability for each industry. Panel B shows the
last 100 observations of book leverage and market-to-book ratio for each industry.
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Panel A: Investment Ratio vs. Internal Cash Flow
Panel B: Investment Ratio vs. Market-to-Book Ratio
Figure 2. Investment ratio versus internal cash ow and market-to-book ratio. The
model is simulated over 100,000 periods for each industry with the parameterizations described in Table
I. The industries are Oil and Gas Extraction (OGE), Chemicals (C), and Printing and Publishing (PP).
Panel A exhibits the last 100 observations of investment ratio and internal cash ow for each industry.




The table presents the values used to parameterize the dynamic model for three di¤erent SIC industries:
Oil and Gas Extraction (OGE), Chemicals (C), and Printing and Publishing (PP). The parameters are
the drift in logs (c), the persistence of prot shocks (), the standard deviation of the innovation term
(), the concavity of the production function (), the operating costs (f), the capital depreciation rate
(), the corporate income tax rate (), the market cost of debt (rB), the market cost of equity (rS), and




The table shows summary statistics from the simulation of the stationary distributions of relevant model
variables for three di¤erent SIC industries: Oil and Gas Extraction (OGE), Chemicals (C), and Printing
and Publishing (PP). The dynamic model is simulated over 100,000 periods for each industry with the
parameterizations described in Table I. The variables are optimal leverage (`), book leverage (`b), market
leverge (`m), dividend payout (dp), dividend ratio (dr), investment ratio (i), protability (p), internal
cash ow (h), tax ratio ( r), market-to-book ratio (q), and prot shocks (z).
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Table III
Leverage and Dividend Regressions
The table presents parameter estimates from pooled OLS regressions for a simulated sample of three
di¤erent SIC industries: Oil and Gas Extraction (OGE), Chemicals (C), and Printing and Publishing
(PP). The dynamic model is simulated over 100,000 periods for each industry with the parameterizations
described in Table I. The regressions employ the last 100 observations from the simulation of each industry.






























The table presents parameter estimates from OLS regressions for a simulated sample of three di¤erent
SIC industries: Oil and Gas Extraction (OGE), Chemicals (C), and Printing and Publishing (PP). The
dynamic model is simulated over 100,000 periods for each industry with the parameterizations described
in Table I. The regressions employ the last 100 observations from the simulation of each industry. OGE
rms pay a relatively low dividend ratio while C and PP rms pay a relatively high dividend ratio. The
dependent variable is investment ratio (ii;t) while the regressors are market-to-book ratio (qi;t 1) and
internal cash ow (hi;t 1). The t-statistics appear in parentheses.
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Table V
Base Case Parameter Values
The table presents the values used to parameterize the base case of the dynamic model for a representative
rm. The parameters are the drift in logs (c), the persistence of prot shocks (), the standard deviation
of the innovation term (), the concavity of the production function (), the operating costs (f), the
capital depreciation rate (), the corporate income tax rate (), the market cost of debt (rB), the market




The table shows summary statistics from the simulation of the stationary distributions of relevant model
variables for a representative rm. The dynamic model is simulated over 100,000 periods (after discarding
the rst 100 observations) with the parameterization described in Table V. The variables are optimal lever-
age (`), book leverage (`b), market leverge (`m), dividend payout (dp), dividend ratio (dr), investment




Sensitivity Analysis of Book Leverage
The table shows the long-run mean of book leverage, E (`b), for di¤erent values of model parameters. The
column labeled Base Case contains the base case parameter values described in Table V while the other
columns contain proportional changes of those initial values. The parameters are the drift in logs (c), the
persistence of prot shocks (), the standard deviation of the innovation term (), the concavity of the
production function (), the operating costs (f), the capital depreciation rate (), the corporate income
tax rate (), the market cost of debt (rB), the market cost of equity (rS), and the growth rate (g).
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Table VIII
Sensitivity Analysis of Dividend Payout
The table shows the long-run mean of dividend payout, E (dp), for di¤erent values of model parameters.
The column labeled Base Case contains the base case parameter values described in Table V while the
other columns contain proportional changes of those initial values. The parameters are the drift in logs
(c), the persistence of prot shocks (), the standard deviation of the innovation term (), the concavity
of the production function (), the operating costs (f), the capital depreciation rate (), the corporate




Sensitivity Analysis of Protability
The table shows the long-run mean of protability, E (p), for di¤erent values of model parameters. The
column labeled Base Case contains the base case parameter values described in Table V while the other
columns contain proportional changes of those initial values. The parameters are the drift in logs (c), the
persistence of prot shocks (), the standard deviation of the innovation term (), the concavity of the
production function (), the operating costs (f), the capital depreciation rate (), the corporate income
tax rate (), the market cost of debt (rB), the market cost of equity (rS), and the growth rate (g).
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Table X
Sensitivity Analysis of Market-to-Book Ratio
The table shows the long-run mean of market-to-book ratio, E (q), for di¤erent values of model parameters.
The column labeled Base Case contains the base case parameter values described in Table V while the
other columns contain proportional changes of those initial values. The parameters are the drift in logs
(c), the persistence of prot shocks (), the standard deviation of the innovation term (), the concavity
of the production function (), the operating costs (f), the capital depreciation rate (), the corporate




Sensitivity Analysis of Investment Ratio
The table shows the long-run mean of investment ratio, E (i), for di¤erent values of model parameters.
The column labeled Base Case contains the base case parameter values described in Table V while the
other columns contain proportional changes of those initial values. The parameters are the drift in logs
(c), the persistence of prot shocks (), the standard deviation of the innovation term (), the concavity
of the production function (), the operating costs (f), the capital depreciation rate (), the corporate




Sensitivity Analysis of Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity
The table shows the regression coe¢ cient on internal cash ow, 2, from the investment regression in
equation (14) for di¤erent values of model parameters. The column labeled Base Case contains the base
case parameter values described in Table V while the other columns contain proportional changes of those
initial values. The parameters are the drift in logs (c), the persistence of prot shocks (), the standard
deviation of the innovation term (), the concavity of the production function (), the operating costs
(f), the capital depreciation rate (), the corporate income tax rate (), the market cost of debt (rB),
the market cost of equity (rS), and the growth rate (g).
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